ELLROD
or "forceful." This point is complicated by the etymology of "dynamic" itself; in Aristotle, of course, dunamis indicates the potential as opposed to the actual. 6 It is necessary, however, to clarify exactly what the "dynamism" of energeia means.
As Blair points out and as Etzwiler emphasizes, Aristotle applies the term energeia to many sorts of reality, not restricting it to those which could plausibly fit the sense of "activity" in English. The examples given in the "definition" by example of Metaphysics IX.6, 1048a25-bl7 While some of the items here correlative to energeia seem to be themselves acting, and others seem to be "brought into act" by something else, all of them are in fact not actions in the usual sense but rather things, substances: one who thinks, builds, is seeing. But in English "activity" would not normally mean a substance of this sort, but something done by a substance: thinking, building, seeing. ("Actuality," or "act," might apply to either, since both the thing and its doing are actual.)
Blair suggests that according to Aristotle's developed thought forms in general were not only "actualities" but "activities," presumably including the substantial form; and Etzwiler concludes bluntly: "Substance is an activity, although admitted ly in an analogous sense, as is seeing, waking, building, and moving-albeit an abiding activity." 8 If all forms, then, are energeiai or "activities," we may say that energeia does in fact describe the actual in general, act as opposed to potency, the real: whatever has "complete reality" qualifies as energeia, as well as whatever pos sesses its end within itself. 9 It is this striking notion, in which everything becomes an "activity," which Etz wiler sees as Aristotle's great contribution to metaphysics, making him a precursor of Whitehead and other process philosophers. 10 If we take for granted this very wide application of the notion of energeia, we may still raise a question concerning Etzwiler's connection of it with a process conception of being. Does this concept of energeia in fact refer to a "process"? II Etzwiler's claim is made plausible by his identification of energeia, read as "ac tivity," with change or becoming. Citing Aristotle's statement that the "chief sense" of energeia is motion. Etzwiler concludes that "energeia is a type of motion or pro cess."" But since even objects or things which we would normally call "substances" are energeiai, this means that "to be blunt, Aristotle actually conceives of realities as activities, as events or occurrences, as we might say now, not as 'things' or 'objects.'" "'Things' he seems to say are really activities, events, processes." "Energeia shares an important feature with motion: that they are both doings, occurrings, happenings.'" 2 While in this last passage Etzwiler seems to conceive energeia as different from, not "a type of," motion, it is clear that the stress is on the transient or passing nature of the realities in question. "Event" and "occur rence" in English suggest that which is temporary and ephemeral; "process," even more, refers to that which does not abide, which either disappears or becomes something else. To be active is, on Etzwiler's reading of Aristotle, to be becoming. Thus activity is contrasted primarily with that which is not only inactive but un changing, not only "inert" but "static": "The real is not'composed of static, inert blocks of being. .. .'" 3 Thus if all realities ("actualities") are activities, and all ac tivities are motions or processes, then all realities are processes.
However, Aristotle claimed that motion is not the best example or perfect type of energeia, as Etzwiler recognizes: "Motion, because it is a process and not all fin ished at once, is an activity, but an incomplete one. '" 4 In the passage he quotes, Physics 201b27-32, Aristotle observes that "motion is thought to be a sort of activi ty." Now this claim, that motion is a type of activity, seems to conflict directly with Etzwiler's claim that activity is a type of motion, as well as with the passage cited above in which they merely "share an important feature." The two cannot be species of each other. The correct interpretation would seem to be suggested by the passage from Aristotle with which Etzwiler introduces his earlier claim: "Activity in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement.'" 5 If activity in one ("strict") sense is the same as motion, it would seem that it has other senses not identical with motion, and thus that motion is a type of activity, not the other way around. This view is supported by Blair's observation that the term energeia in its original definition "has no reference to change; the question in his [Aristotle's] mind is not 'How does A become B?' but 'When is a non-A an A? When it has the power to do what A does.' '" 6 While change may be an instance of energeia, "power and activity have more uses than mere references to processes. '" 7 If this is correct, then, we would expect to find some instances of energeia, "act" or "activity," which are not processes, which do not inherently involve change. And in fact this is what we do find. Pleasure, for instance, as Aristotle tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics, is an activity, but not necessarily a process: We may enjoy something over a period of time, yet not change at all in our enjoy ment, but merely continue to enjoy; this is an act, but not a transition, rather a per sisting in being what one is. An activity may be complete and whole in itself, and thus require no change or progress. 19 In the passage quoted above Aristotle is point ing out that pleasures are not processes in order to show that they are not ipso facto disqualified as candidates for the name of happiness, eudaimonia; it thus seems reasonable to assume that happiness, too, while not (as he later shows) a pleasure, is also not a process, giving us a second example of activity aside from process. 20 Equally important, however, is that act which, according to the interpretation of Blair and Etzwiler, constitutes substance. Etzwiler holds, as we have seen, that "Aristotle maintains that things not only perform actions; they are actions. They are events or happenings." 21 If substance too is energeia, then one does have to say that it is in the same sense active, "dynamic," not merely inert; and this does run con trary to at least one view of substance. Blair notes that "it would seem that he [Aristotle] is trying to say that form is what matter, in a sense, does, since motion is the primary sense of energeia." 12 But this does not necessarily mean that substance is therefore a process, since some energeiai are not processes.
What, within the class of energeiai or activities, would differentiate the process from the non-process? Presumably, change: a process is a becoming, an alteration from moment to moment, and a non-process would then be something which stays the same, in some respects at least (as in the example of pleasure above). But of course the very meaning of "substance" is that which "stands under" a change without itself changing, that which remains through accidental alteration. And Etz wiler, recognizing this, is forced to claim paradoxically that some processes do not change but remain: "Substance is an activity although admittedly in an analogous sense, as is seeing, waking, building, and moving-albeit an abiding activity." "Substance, one might say, is a kind of radical occurring or doing, that can be abiding." 23 The act of substance is precisely to abide, not to change. And this abidingness is not merely the continuity of a protracted action, as with pleasure, else pleasure too would be a substance: it is that stable continuity which serves as a foun dation for other activities, for qualities, relations, and actions-all of which may be energeiai, but all of which are not necessarily processes. 24 We are left with a picture of substance which is active, yet enduring: a paradoxical 24 In discussing productive action, Etzwiler attempts to identify the product with the activity of produc tion, which Aristotle says is "in" the product (p. 320). Aristotle, however, makes it clear that among ends, "some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them" (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a3-5, emphasis added).
picture, but perhaps not so paradoxical if we recall how it is that a human being ac tually "stands," actively resisting the force of gravity. Our conclusion, then, sug gests that Etzwiler is mistaken in thinking of the abiding of substance as necessarily inert and undynamic, in linking the permanent with the inactive; in failing to con ceive of a being whose constitution as well as whose action is "dynamic." 25 It should be noted that the continuity of substance need not be its only "activity" (and here, perhaps, "act" may in fact be the better translation, since it may cover both the abiding and the changing, both the thing and its action). 26 The becoming of a substance may also be an act, an energeia. But another category of act may be represented by action, or praxis, as in speaking or flute-playing; Hannah Arendt seems to consider this the whole meaning of energeia. 11 Pleasure and happiness, as described above, may belong to this category, although the point is disputed. 28 In any case, Aristotle's denial that these things are processes, though they are energeiai, would suffice to show that not all energeiai are thought of as processes.
hi
The notion of the unchanging but active is sufficiently clear in Aristotle to be noted by Etzwiler against the grain of his argument: "That which is wholly active is immutable precisely because it is not in process to further completion." 29 What, then, is the point of calling Aristotle's view a "process" view of being? It would cer tainly be useful to characterize such a view as a "dynamic" view (again prescinding from etymology), or an "active" view; but it seems hard to escape the sense of change in the word "process," which makes it a misleading characterization of all being according to Aristotle.
The answer may be that Etzwiler has taken the only two possible alternatives to be "object" (static, inactive) and "process" (active, dynamic); this is the contrast that reappears in his discussion. 30 If my argument is correct, then this disjunction is maintained at the cost of missing Aristotle's real metaphysical insight, which is that there is another possibility, a middle ground: the object which abides yet is active, the enduring "thing" which is not frozen but flexible in its enduring, as when substantial identity persists during accidental change. If subsisting is itself active, as Blair argues, then the transition from being to doing is not as drastic as it might seem when substances are conceived of as static: in the case of the singer singing or the listener enjoying we have "being-at-work," reduced neither to the inert being nor to the unsupported work. While Etzwiler opposes such a formulation, 31 it seems clearly superior to the one in which changes, actions, qualities, and substances are all re 25 We may note here in passing that Etzwiler's view of substance tends also to force him toward the view that substance (which is "activity") is also power (pp. 324-25), i.e., that ability which is not at the mo ment active; or, in effect, that the power in act and the power not in act are the same, both identical to "substance."
26 Cf. Penner, p. 430. 27 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 206. For a related point, cf. Matthew J. Kelly, "St. Thomas and Transeunt Causality," New Scholasticism, 54 (1980) , 42-43, where "perfection" seems to play the same role as does "act" or energeia here.
28 Penner, pp. 399, 403. "Etzwiler, p. 321; cf. p. 331, and Blair, p. 106. 30 Cf., for example, pp. 319, 322, 328, 331. 31 Etzwiler, pp. 312, 314, 316 .
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ELLROD ferred to as "processes" or "events," as long as it is kept in mind that a "substance" or "thing" is not per se dead and inactive. In what sense, then, are we to take Aristotle's assertion that the chief or primary sense of energeia is motion? While an extensive textual analysis of Aristotle's mean ing cannot be undertaken here, two related observations may be made. The first is that according to Blair's interpretation of the Protrepticus passage in which energeia is first defined, Aristotle compares it to motion not in the sense of transition from one state to another, but in that of a continuing state, waking: "he uses 'motion' kinesis as the synonym for energeia, and not for the change that precedes this mo tion (i.e. the transition from potency to activity)." 32 This suggests that the "motion" to which energeia is compared is in this case not that of alteration, but that of local motion, "motion" in the usual English sense, which is one meaning of kinesis.
The second observation is that the way in which the "motion" sense of energeia is primary might still be that of the order of knowledge rather than the order of reality. It might be that we first come to know energeia through motion, although it is not in fact the most ontologically basic of the types of energeia; just as a modern physicist might say that while macroscopic phenomena are first in our experience, they are really less fundamental than subatomic particles. Thus Aristotle might consistently say that the energeia of motion comes first in our experience, but in reality motion, as an accident, depends on the existence of a substance (another type of energeia) which moves. 33 If this suggestion is correct, then the two observations converge to indicate that for Aristotle motion is the most evident and salient case of energeia, and thus, since energeia cannot be defined but only displayed by example, 3 '' the case on which our knowledge is based. If so, then motion might still be the case with which we first become acquainted and which continues to play a key role in our knowledge of energeia, while in reality the primary case would be that of substance. Local motion would be said, plausibly enough, to be the most prominently active of all energeiai, while the "activity" of substance is more fundamental but more deeply hidden.
IV
If my argument has been correct, then Aristotle's use of energeia does not indicate a "process" conception of being, for "process" would suggest becoming or altera tion and energeia does not always mean this. Change is an energeia, but not every energeia is a change. Instead, the insight we should draw from Aristotle's usage is very nearly the reverse: even unchanging realities may be active in some sense, "energetic" rather than dead and inert; the subsisting of substance is to be regarded as an achievement (a "doing") rather than as mere inertial persistence. Etzwiler has claimed that since all reality is dynamic, all reality is change or "process"; instead, I suggest, since all reality is dynamic but all reality is not changing, there must be a "Blair, p. 106. "This suggestion would be that "motion" is not only the temporally original sense (since Blair [p. 107] states that such a restricted sense is excluded by the Greek), but that "motion" is also the sense from which our knowledge is basically drawn even after the term has been extended to other uses.
"See Blair, pp. 107-108.
